

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108
S - 709,123

JUL 8 1974

CIA curbs pushed in Senate

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WASHINGTON — Legislation was introduced in the Senate Wednesday to require the Central Intelligence Agency to limit its covert operations, supply its estimates to Congress and disclose how it spends its money.

The bills reflected the two-fold reaction in Congress to the disclosures of the top-secret Pentagon history of the Vietnam War: praise for the CIA's 20-year record of sound assessments and concern with its clandestine maneuverings.

None of the bills is likely to receive the approval of President Nixon. Since the CIA was created in 1947, a succession of Democratic and Republican Presidents have treated the agency as their private source of information and a vehicle for performing "dirty tricks" outside the knowledge of Congress and the people.

Ever since the United States became involved in Vietnam in 1950, the CIA has produced intelligence estimates that would have been embarrassing to the incumbent President if they had been made available to the opposition party or leaked to the public.

For example, as The Sun-Times disclosed June 26, the CIA provided an estimate in 1969 that Mr. Nixon could have withdrawn immediately from Vietnam and "all of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation."

Similar CIA estimates, revealed by The Sun-Times and other newspapers, showed that Presidents Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson were consistently warned that the Saigon regime lacked broad popular support and that deeper U.S. involvement would be risky.

But the Pentagon papers also disclosed that, while the CIA's intelligence division was sounding the alarm, its plans division was conducting clandestine raids in North Vietnam and plotting first for and then against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Legislation introduced by Sen. Clifford Case (R-N.J.) would limit such operations and the use of covert funds and military equipment to support them without specific approval by Congress.

Case said his proposal is designed "to place some outside control on what has been the free-wheeling operation of the executive branch in carrying on foreign policy and even waging foreign wars."

Sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.), only de-

clared presidential contender, offered the bill to require disclosure of the CIA's budget and prevent its money from being concealed in appropriations for other agencies.

It is reliably estimated that the CIA spends \$1 billion a year. An additional \$4 billion reportedly is spent by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the code-making and code-breaking National Security Agency, and the various military units that run the spy satellite program.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky) introduced the bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 so that the CIA would be required to supply its intelligence estimates to the House and Senate committees dealing with foreign affairs and the armed services.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
TRIBUNE

Jul 8 1977
M - 240,275
S - 674,302

Pentagon Papers: the early years

"We have concentrated on killing the enemy and bringing our material resources to bear on the outcome of the war. These actions have had some success in teaching the Communists the costly folly of adventuring into 'wars of national liberation.' The same actions, though, have taught us that the American tendency to rely mostly on muscle and material wealth is not good enough to achieve the goals to which we and the Vietnamese aspire."

illustrate the evidence from which one must conclude that U.S. policy was based on the same principles from one administration to the next. The principle on which Lansdale's para-military operations were based can be seen in a 1954 National Security Council directive that the United States should "accept nothing short of a military victory in Indochina."

Similarly, when Vice-President Lyndon Johnson returned from a 1961 visit to the area, he said in a memorandum to President Kennedy that "the battle against communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there." With few exceptions, and despite serious reservations by U.S. intelligence agencies, the recommendations of countless fact-finding missions were in the end to rely on those most prominent American assets — in Lansdale's words, "muscle and material wealth."

✓ That statement, written in 1968 by retired Air Force Gen. Edward Lansdale after his return from Vietnam, says much about the early hopes, accumulated frustrations and lack of American solutions to the Indochina dilemma. It has particular significance coming from Lansdale, whose service in Vietnam began in 1954 and, with an interlude in America (reportedly to develop Special Forces), ended 14 years later. Identified by the Pentagon Papers as a CIA member, Lansdale was given responsibility for organizing and carrying out sabotage and psychological warfare against the Viet Minh in 1954 and 1955 as the French withdrew. He was assisted by ✓ another U.S. officer, Lucien Conein, who first arrived in Vietnam by parachute in 1944. Conein became so trusted by Vietnamese generals that he was in their headquarters when they launched their 1963 coup against the Diem regime.

Those are only fragments of information from that part of the secret Pentagon study dealing with early American involvement in Vietnam. But they

Soon after the Pentagon Papers began to be published last month, some partisans were quick to attribute blame or credit to the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson. In our opinion, the Pentagon study adds little credit to any. It detracts substantially from all. But beyond that, we believe, it reveals the dangerous potential for national self-deception when a democratic government loses confidence in the judgment of its citizens. The aftermath of self-deception is the loss of confidence by citizens in the judgment of their government.

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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000300360102-0

Full Viet Story Is Needed

A FEW MONTHS AGO, the historians who are charged with writing the U.S. Army's history of the Vietnam war requested access to the 47-volume Pentagon study authorized by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The request was denied.

Now that The New York Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers have published lengthy articles based on the Pentagon papers, the Army historians will probably be given access. Nevertheless the incident is worthy of note. It illustrates the squeamishness and protectiveness of government offices and bureaus about the story of their involvement—and the extreme

difficulty which confronts the American people in obtaining a full, fair and rounded history of the war.

The Pentagon papers, valuable as they are to our knowledge of some of the estimates and decisions at the Department of Defense and elsewhere, tell only fragments of the whole story which the people deserve and the spirit of the times demands.

There is only a whisper in the Pentagon papers of the decision-making and military and political action by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong—though this was a highly important determination of the action by the United States. Hardly anything is said of American public opinion, Congress, presidential politics or press reporting—all of which are fundamental elements of the story. Little is said about the military action in the field.

THE AUTHORS of the Pentagon study, as is well known, did not have access to most of the record of White House decision-making—yet even the choice of specific bombing targets was discussed and sometimes decided at Presidential level. The Pentagon authors do not appear to have had full access to the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency record.

Even within the Department of Defense, the McNamara-sponsored historians do not appear to have all the important papers. There is little indication, for example, that the authors of the study were allowed to see the important messages which flowed in profusion between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Saigon command over the "back channel," a special intelligence communication system safe from the eyes of Pentagon civilians or anyone else.

Quite apart from possible bias by the men who com-

plied the Pentagon papers, it is clear that this single set of documents is far from the whole truth. Former President Johnson's forthcoming memoirs, valuable though they may be in portraying the view from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, are unlikely to satisfy the need for the complete story. And as the experience of the Army historians indicates, the military histories of this war may be much less than fully rounded—and it will be decades before they are out, in any case.

THE EXTRAORDINARY crisis of confidence resulting from the Vietnam war cries out for extraordinary action to make the full story available. The best way to proceed, in my opinion, would be government sponsorship of an independent study by respected scholars, perhaps under the aegis of the American Historical Association. Prof. Joseph Strayer of Princeton, president of the association, and Prof. James MacGregor Burns of Williams, the historian of Roosevelt's wartime years, have told me in telephone interviews of their personal conviction that something should be done.

The scholars named to study the Vietnam war should be authorized access to all the relevant papers from all departments concerning Indochina from World War II through 1968. They should be instructed to produce within two years—by late 1973—a documented history of the U.S. involvement in the war, to be published by the Government Printing Office together with texts of the important documents themselves. The only deletions would be those which meet the test of "direct, immediate and irreparable damage" to the nation and people.

This would only be a first step. There would all be working and thinking from a full and common set of facts.

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